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WHAT'S NEXT AFTER SEPARATIONISM?t
John H. Garvey*
Professor Carl Esbeck argues in his article' that the traditional theory of
separationism is giving way to a theory of equality (or more accurately, pro-
tection for religious choice). The argument is very astute, and I agree with
much of it. I will give my own perspective on the same two points.
I. SEPARATIONISM
A. Indirect Aid
Separationism is a theory about cause and effect.2 Lemon v. Kurtzman3
states the rule: the government must not cause religious effects. The distinc-
tion between direct and indirect aid is one way of implementing this rule.
Indirect aid (e.g., vouchers, tax deductions) does not cause trouble for the
government because there is an intervening cause: the individual who receives
the aid can spend it in a number of different places. Hart and Honor6 illus-
trate this way of thinking in their book Causation in the Law:4
If a guest sits down at a table laid with knife and fork and plunges the
knife into his hostess's breast, her death is not in any context...
thought of as caused by, or the effect or result of the waiter's action in
laying the table....
The Supreme Court in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind' adopted a similar paradigm:
t This Article was first presented at a workshop on the Constitutionality of Governmental Coopera-
tion with Religious Social Ministries, on August 2-3, 1996, sponsored by the Religious Social-Sector Project.
of the Center for Public Justice, in response to a paper presented by Professor Carl Esbeck, also published in
this issue of the Emory Law Journal. See infra note I.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Ser-
vice Providers, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1997).
"I explain this point at more length in an article entitled Another Way of Looking at School Aid.
1985 Sup. CT. REV. 61.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 70 (1959).
-' 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).
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Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely indepen-
dent and private choices of aid recipients.
Suppose now that the government gives the individual recipient aid that can
only be used at a religious institution. In this case the outcome has been dif-
ferent. Joel Feinberg explains the distinction in his book Doing & Deserv-
ing:
6
If the murder occurred in a prison dining hall ... where knives are nev-
er set on tables and diners may be expected to get violent, then the lay-
ing of the table would be the abnormal event of great explanatory pow-
er, and the provision of opportunity "the cause." The pertinent principle
here is that the more expectable human behavior is, whether voluntary
or not, the less likely it is to "negative causal connection."
The Court has reached a similar conclusion in cases about tuition grants that
can only be used at private schools. Consider Committee for Public Education
v. Nyquist: New York gave low-income parents $50 to $100 to reimburse
them for tuition paid at nonpublic schools So as Professor Esbeck correctly
observes,9 the rule about indirect aid is this: It is permissible if given on
equal terms to people who can spend it at religious and other institutions.
B. Direct Aid: Separate Secular Services
The Court has sometimes approved even direct aid to religious institutions
under the rule of separation."° Once again the question has been whether the
government causes religious effects. It does not, the Court has said, when the
recipient can separate its religious and secular services, and the aid goes
strictly to the secular side." This requires an effort on both sides-by the re-
cipient and by the government-to keep money out of religious pockets. The
recipient must divide its programs and activities into secular ones and reli-
gious ones. Think of the institution as a pool table with pockets on each side.
You can see the effect of this rule on the campuses of religious colleges:
some buildings are swept clean of religious icons, some courses are taught in
6 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 166 (1970).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Id. at 764.
Esbeck, supra note 1, at 6.
" See generally Garvey, supra note 2.
Id.
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a way that makes no mention of religion. The end result of this process is to
put religion off in one place all by itself-like the divinity schools at Har-
vard, Chicago, and Duke. This is, to my mind, the most pernicious effect of
the rule of separation. To obtain government aid, religious institutions will
abandon or "privatize" their mission in much of what they do.
As for the government, we must keep an eye on the aid to see which pock-
et it goes into. This is often just a matter of accounting rules. For example, in
Roemer v. Board of Public Works,'2 a college aid case, the Court held that a
state could give noncategorical grants to private (including religious) colleges,
provided the schools segregated the funds, agreed not to spend the money for
sectarian purposes, and accounted for the funds at the end of the year. 3 The
government has its accountants watch the ball to ensure it goes into a secular
pocket.
A variation on this solution is to provide aid in kind (books, tests, diagnos-
tic services), so it cannot be converted to religious use. This type of aid will
fit only in the secular pocket, so we need not watch it.
Although I have been using school aid cases as examples, this way of
thinking is also evident in the two direct-aid social services cases that the
Court has decided. In Bowen v. Kendrick,4 the more recent decision, the
Court upheld a facial challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA).'5 AFLA permitted religious institutions to get federal grants to run
programs for the care and prevention of teenage pregnancy.'6 You can imag-
ine the local office of Catholic Social Services doing this. Of course, the
counselors at Catholic Social Services might say that the Bible, for a variety
of good reasons, frowns on sex before marriage. The Court assumed that if
that happened, aid would have gone into the wrong pocket. As I said, howev-
er, the suit was a challenge to AFLA on its face, and the Court said that
"nothing in our prior cases warrants the presumption ... that religiously
affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their functions under
the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner.""
426 U.S. 736 (1976).
" Id. at 741-43.
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1994).
16 Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593.
" Id. at 612.
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It is possible to read the Court's opinion in Bradfield v. Roberts'8 in the
same way. That case was a challenge on its face to a law appropriating mon-
ey to Providence Hospital in the District of Columbia, a hospital run by the
Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg, Maryland. The Court upheld the grant
saying, "[t]here is no allegation that its hospital work is confined to members
of that church or that in its management the hospital has been conducted so
as to violate its charter in the smallest degree."' 9
II. EQUALITY
A. What Is Wrong with Causing Religious Effects?
Separationism was the rule in Establishment Clause cases for three or four
decades, but I think Professor Esbeck is right to suggest that its reign is end-
ing. In fact, I would say that the end of separationism has been coming about
since Ronald Reagan's first term. In his article, The Lingering Death of
Separationism, Professor Ira Lupu gives several examples of this trend:20
1. New History: Since 1947, the official history of the Establishment Clause
has been the one Justices Black and Rutledge wrote in Everson v. Board of
Education.2 ' Everson stressed the role of Madison and Jefferson in
Virginia's break with the Anglican church. But today we are more aware of
the role that Congregationalists in New England and evangelicals in the North
and South played in the early constitutional debates. Justice Rehnquist legiti-
mized this history in 1985 in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree.
2. Justiciability Retreat: In the 1960s Flast v. Cohen23 created a special
standing rule designed to encourage Establishment Clause claims. In 1982 the
Court denied standing to a separationist organization challenging the federal
government's transfer of some land to a Christian school for its ministry.24
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
" Id. at 298.
-0 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
330 U.S. I (1947).
472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2' Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State. 454 U.S.
464 (1982).
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3. New Symbols: In 1983 and 1984, the Court approved legislative prayer
and a municipal nativity scene.25 This has not meant a regime of laissez-
faire, 26 but it is inconsistent with strict separationism.
4. School Aid: The low point undoubtedly came in Aguilar v. Felton27 and
Grand Rapids v. Ball,28 but since 1983 the Court has allowed aid to parochi-
al schools in Mueller v. Allen29 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
.District." In addition, I think the Court essentially approved vouchers in
Witters.3
Why is this happening? One part of the answer is that the world has
changed. Professor Lupu explains:
Separationism thrived best when white Anglo-Saxon Protestants of low-
level religious intensity constituted the bulk of our cultural elite. For
members of this group, separationism reflected an attractive mix of pri-
vatized (hence unobtrusive) religion, opposition to a public subsidy of
the educational mission of the Roman Catholic Church, and support for
the mission of socializing Americans in what this elite perceived as the
common American culture.
32
Since then, the cultural elite has gr6wn more diverse, America has had a
spiritual awakening, and the public schools have lost our confidence.
Another part of the answer is that separationism rests on doubtful axioms.
Professor Esbeck puts his finger on the most important one. In nearly all of
these cases we are talking about aid that causes religious side effects. The aid
is designed to improve math skills or cure hepatitis, but may incidentally help
religion because it is given to religious providers. We assume that it is bad
for the government to cause religious side effects.33 But why is it bad? Con-
sider an analogy to equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause-like the
Establishment Clause-holds that the government should not give aid to
schools, hospitals, or lunch counters that engage in racial discrimination.34
" Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
' See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). The Supreme Court has agreed to reexamine its decision this term. Agostini
v. Felton, Nos. 96-552 and 96-553 (argued April 15, 1997).
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
" 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
" Witters v. Washington Dept. of Svcs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
'- Lupu. supra note 20, at 231.
" See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
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The reason is that aid designed to improve math skills or cure hepatitis at
segregated institutions will have the unpleasant side effect of promoting dis-
crimination as well. But there is a difference between the two cases. Religion
is not intrinsically evil like race discrimination; quite the contrary. When
government aid causes religious side effects, such side effects are not inher-
ently bad, like bigotry. In the case of religion, the harm occurs one step fur-
ther removed. When government aid goes to religion we might then see:
1. Bad secondary effects on the political system. Some people will form reli-
gious parties and fight (like "special interest groups") for subsidies. Others
will form antireligious parties and fight (like "public interest groups") against
aid for principles they oppose.
2. Bad secondary effects on religion. Madison argued in his Memorial and
Remonstrance35 that aid has a debilitating effect. Religion that does not have
to feed itself gets fat and lazy.
But we do not have additional effects like these every time government aid
causes religious side effects. Suppose that in Bradfield the federal government
not only built the isolation ward but also paid $500,000 to run it for a year.
And suppose that the Sisters of Charity who staffed it offered prayers and
spiritual comfort to patients who wanted them. This would violate the princi-
ple of separation because the nuns have not split apart their secular and reli-
gious activities. Therefore, we cannot be sure which ones the federal money
is going to pay for. But as long as the nuns must provide what Jesse Choper
calls "full secular value"" we are unlikely to have churches lining up for
government subsidies and ministers retiring on government pensions. To get a
$500,000 grant a recipient has to spend at least that much running a hospital.
That is not a very attractive proposition for an institution seeking a handout.
Here is a second doubtful axiom behind the rule of separation. We assume
that if government and religion are kept separate, religious groups can raise
their own money, live their own lives, provide their own services, etc. In an
eighteenth-century world of minimalist government this may have been so.
But suppose you had a socialist government that taxed people at ninety-five
percent and handed out land, money, and jobs according to a ten-year master
(1961); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
' James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785) in 8 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
' JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 177 (1995).
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plan for production and consumption of goods and services.37 In that kind of
society churches could not raise money. In fact, they could not even build
churches unless the government gave them land and money. I think our Con-
stitution would permit that kind of economy. If it did, I think the Free Exer-
cise Clause would require (not just permit) the government to give money to
churches. So what the First Amendment means for government aid depends
upon the tax rate: at some point religious groups cannot raise their own mon-
ey, provide their own services, etc., and the government is responsible for
their difficulties because it has absorbed all the available resources. We are
not yet at that point. But neither are we in the same place we were during the
eighteenth century. The theory of separation must take account of that.
Here is a third and final point about the assumptions of separationism.
Suppose that Congress appropriated $100 million for refurbishing local art
galleries throughout the country. To qualify for funding, however, a gallery
would have to promise to remove from public display any homoerotic sculp-
ture, paintings, or photographs. This would be challenged, and I think held
invalid, as an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of First Amendment
rights. The government, we would say, cannot penalize those who take a
particular point of view by withholding aid that is available to all other insti-
tutions in the same class. It is not a sufficient response to say that the dis-
qualified gallery can still exhibit any art it wishes and raise money privately
for its own refurbishing. And yet this is exactly what the theory of separation
requires us to say about aid to religious institutions. If Congress gives money
for math education, schools cannot qualify for this funding if they offer reli-
gion classes."
B. Equal Aid
If separationism is on the way out, what will replace it? Principles of
equality or neutrality will surely play an important part in any eventual solu-
tion.
This is certainly true of many cases about religious expression. In a handful
of recent cases the Court has applied the First Amendment rule of content
" Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 522-23 (1968).
39 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). See also Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional
Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989).
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neutrality to religious speech. Most involved the use of public forums. The
trend started in Widmar v. Vincent39 in 1981. In the 1990s the trend contin-
ued with Westside Community Board of Education v. Mergens," Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School,4 and Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board v. Pinette.42 The only doubt I have about this area is
that the free speech rule about traditional public forums, enforced in Pinette,
is in some tension with the Establishment Clause rule about holiday dis-
plays.43 There are four votes, led by Justice Scalia in Pinette, for the propo-
sition that the no-discrimination rule always trumps the no-establishment
rule." But the fifth vote is Justice O'Connor, and she often engages in ad
hoe balancing in these cases to determine whether there is an Establishment
Clause violation.
This rule of content neutrality rests on assumptions that are unique to the
Free Speech Clause: that truth will prevail over falsehood in a fair fight and
that public discussions should be uninhibited because people need information
to vote intelligently. For this reason we cannot assume that the principle of
neutrality automatically carries over to aid cases. Whether it is a related or an
independent development, though, there is a discernible trend toward a rule of
neutrality in aid cases too. The principle has been around for a while. It ap-
peared in 1970 in Walz v. Tax Commission.45 The Court extended the princi-
ple to schools in 1983 in Mueller v. Allen.46 Walz and Mueller involved tax
exemptions and deductions. In 1986 in Witters, the Court applied the rule to
an outright grant.47 One way to explain the result, which appeals to
separationists, is to say that the grant was indirect. But another way to see it
is that the state made funds available to all blind people and expressed no
preference about where they should spend it. This is equal treatment of all
institutions. The Court said something similar in Zobrest in 1993.
Last year the Court suggested that the government was sometimes re-
quired-not just permitted-to give aid to religious groups if it gave aid to
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
4' 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
42 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
41 See ACLU v. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 688 (1984).
" 115 S. Ct. at 2442 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas.
4" 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
4' 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
4' 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).
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similarly situated nonreligious groups. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the Unitersity of Virginia" the Court held that if Virginia intended to pay
student fees for the printing of student publications, it could not exclude a
publication that took a Christian point of view." I do not want to overstate
the importance of the case. It was about speech, after all, so the principle
does not automatically work for aid to hospitals, orphanages, and soup kitch-
ens.
I do not want to suggest that the idea of neutrality, if applied sensitively,
will solve all Establishment Clause problems. I think this is unlikely. In free
speech law, for example, the rule of content neutrality figures prominently in
public forum cases; but we also have rules about prior restraints, overbreadth,
commercial speech, libel, obscenity, and so on, and they are not all particular
applications of a more general neutrality principle. The same is true here. The
religious speech cases I mentioned (Widmar, Mergens, Lamb's Chapel,
Pinette) were all public forum cases, but religious speech problems can arise
in other contexts where neutrality is not the answer." There is a sense in
which regulatory exemptions are not neutral, but they are consistent with the
Establishment Clause." And the rules of neutrality that we do use in Estab-
lishment Clause cases may differ frbm one another: the first two aid cases
(Walz, Mueller) held that equal treatment was permitted; the free speech rule
of neutrality is mandatory.
I add all this as a caution, rather than to undercut my general agreement
with Professor Esbeck. I think he is right that separationism is falling out of
favor. And I also think that a principle of equality or neutrality will play an
important part in filling the gap that it leaves.
" 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
'9 Id. at 2524-25.
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
" See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). See generaly Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I (1989).
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